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Abstract 
 
A key theme of the EU Port Policy has been the establishment of free market access to the provision of 
port services in EU ports. However, two successive European Commission proposals for a relevant EU 
port services directive (PSD) failed to produce a new policy regime. This paper examines the mobilisation 
of maritime interests, aiming to identify stakeholders’ preferences and their contribution to the rejection 
of this port policy proposal. The analysis suggests that, although they did not share the same perspective, 
the views of organised maritime interests shared a common denominator: they were against the proposed 
EU rule due to its structural deficiencies. Assisted by the industrial heterogeneity, the difficulties to 
implement a ‘one size fits all ports’ policy, and the observed institutional tensions a variety of vested 
interests frequently with monopolistic positions contributed to the produced policy output failure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following a lengthy consultation process, an overwhelming majority of the European 
Parliament (EP) voted, in January 2006, against the adoption of a European 
Commission proposal for a Directive aiming to establish free market access to port 
services, the so-called ‘port services directive’ (PSD). The paper analyses the role of 
maritime interests within this consultation process and assesses their contribution to this 
policy output failure.  
This was the Commission’s second unsuccessful attempt to establish a common 
European regulatory framework regarding the provision of port services in the major 
European ports. A narrow majority of the EP plenary session rejected the first proposal 
in December 2003. The almost immediate publication of a revised PSD proposal (PSD 
II) in October 2004 aimed to iron out the most controversial issues, yet the EP argued 
that this second proposal resembled the first one. Still, the EP reactions to the 
Commission’s political manoeuvres can partially account for the produced output-
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failure. This is because in both cases the EU-level interest groups representing 
stakeholders have been mobilised aiming to influence the policy-making process. Some 
of them united in seeking to preserve the status quo and did so successfully.  
The search for a long-term EU Port Policy has been marked by the mobilisation of, 
and conflicts between, contending maritime interests, frequently with monopolistic 
positions (Baird, 1982; Pallis, 1997; Chlomoudis and Pallis, 2002). European Port 
Policy changes are the result of a dynamic process within which national governments 
and EU institutions need stakeholders’ consensus to transform policy ideas to policy 
rules. Evidently, there are different opinions regarding several aspects of this policy, 
including the proposed PSD on port services liberalisation. Thus, the EU policy-making 
does not necessarily produce collective policy outcomes. 
Via a comparative content analysis of their position papers published at various stages 
of the consultation process, the paper concludes with the contribution of maritime 
interests to the failure of translating the Commission’s second proposal into an adopted 
EU port services directive.  In Section 2, the paper briefly presents the content of the 
proposed port policy regime, while Section 3 discusses the observed institutional 
tensions between the Commission and the European Parliament regarding the prospect 
of converting this proposal into an EU policy. Section 4 analyses the stance of vested 
interests and the final Section presents the conclusions of this analysis. 
 
 
2. The proposal for a Port Services Directive (PSD) 
 
On November 20, 2003, the EP rejected the European Commission’s first proposal on 
a PSD that would liberalise market access to port services, by a narrow majority (CEU, 
2001). Within less than a year the Commission reintroduced the issue in the agenda of 
the EU port policy emphasising its intention not to abandon this effort. The PSD ‘was 
complex, but necessary’ (ESPO, 2004a); thus, in October 2004, it published a second 
proposal, the PSD II (CEU, 2004). 
The initial proposal aimed at establishing open access on the basis of transparency, 
non-discrimination, and principles on issues like charging, public service obligations, as 
well as safety. Another objective was to assure that there were at least two service 
providers for each one of the three categories of port services: (a) technical-navigational 
services (pilotage, towage, mooring); (b) cargo-handling services (stevedoring, stowage, 
transhipment and other intra-terminal transport, storage, depot and warehousing); and 
(c) passenger services (embarkation, disembarkation).  
The right to grant authorisations would be maintained by national governments, while 
the level of investment contemplated by the service provider would determine the 
maximum length of each authorisation. The aim was to ensure free competition within 
each port. In general, intra-port competition helps to eliminate any (private or public) 
strategy of price discrimination (i.e. according to demand elasticity) and monopolistic 
rent seeking. Inter-port competition also fosters specialisation (De Langen and Pallis, 
2006a; Goss, 2006). 
A further provision considered the right of port users to cargo self-handling. “Self-
handling’ is a situation in which an undertaking, which normally could buy port 
services, provides for itself, using its own land-based personnel and its own equipment, 
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one or more categories of port services. Along with the liberalization of pilotage, these 
have been the most controversial issues within the EU decision-making process. 
Following a lengthy consultation, the EU institutions detailed a compromise 
including: (a) the obligation of every port to submit information on its financial 
relations; (b) the obligation of newly authorised service providers to compensate former 
providers in those cases that the duration of their authorisation would be reduced; (c) the 
application of the rule in the case of pilotage according to safety criteria and public 
service requirements; and (d) the conditional permission of self-handling. Still, the 
European Parliament rejected this agreement (November 2003). This rejection was 
portrayed as a triumph by a heterogeneous spectrum of stakeholders ranging from 
dockers to some private ports (Psaraftis, 2005). 
The revised PSD proposal was very similar on the grounds of definitions, scope, and 
objectives, (i.e. selection procedures for authorisations, neutrality of competent 
authority in selection, limitations, provisions for pilotage, financial transparency issues), 
with the exception of self-handling. The spirit of change could be found in the strictness 
and the mandatory character of the regime regarding authorisations, shorter maximum 
durations for each authorisation, and a new and broader definition of self-handling 
(Pallis and Vaggelas, 2005). 
The directive would apply to any EU port, provided that its average annual throughput 
over the last three years has not been under three million tonnes or 500.000 passenger 
movements. In cases of ports reaching the freight traffic threshold without reaching the 
corresponding passenger movement one, the provisions of the Directive would not have 
been applicable to port services reserved exclusively for passengers, and vice versa. The 
implication was that, if adopted, the directive would have had an immediate effect on 
the provision of port services in 364 ports throughout Europe (DfT, 2005), 
comprehensively altering the structure of the EU port system. 
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Table 1: Total freight and passenger movement in ports implementing the PSD and in all EU ports (by 
EU member-state; in .000) 
  Total freight tonnage, by  Total passenger movements, by 
Member State No of 
PSD 
ports 
(i) PSD 
ports 
(ii) all 
ports 
PSD as % 
of total 
No of 
PSD 
ports1 
(i) PSD 
ports 
(ii) all ports PSD as % 
of total 
Belgium 4 178,689 181,110 99% 0 591 739 80% 
Cyprus 2 4,823 7,220 67% 0 287 287 100% 
Denmark 14 77,061 103,954 74% 36 47,352 48,653 97% 
Estonia 4 43,467 44,682 97% 0 5,172 5,172 100% 
Finland 16 90,633 104,439 87% 2 15,865 16,341 97% 
France 19 308,767 319,032 97% 8 27,148 27,405 99% 
Germany 16 246,349 254,834 97% 22 30,009 32,146 93% 
Greece 20 132,870 - - 0 - - - 
Ireland 4 36,927 44,919 82% 2 3,567 3,747 95% 
Italy 38 457,789 477,028 96% 27 79,831 82,576 97% 
Netherlands 10 407,421 410,330 99% 0 1,981 2,015 98% 
Norway 11 148,486 190,034 78% 1 4,598 4,656 99% 
Poland 5 50,712 51,020 99% 0 2,886 3,188 91% 
Portugal 5 53,888 57,470 94% 0 - - - 
Slovenia 1 10,720 10,788 99% 0 - - - 
Spain 24 321,651 326,001 99% 2 19,510 20,041 97% 
Sweden 25 136,626 161,454 85% 5 32,263 32,748 99% 
UK 40 526,869 555,662 95% 5 33,009 33,708 98% 
Note 1: In addition to ports that already meet the freight traffic threshold. 
Source: UK Department for Transport, 2005 (Annex, D). 
 
 
3. Major issues of conflict 
 
This Commission’s second initiative (PSD II) created tensions between stakeholders 
and the EU institutions. A major issue related to the selection procedure for 
authorisations for service provision. Among the main questions was the maximum 
duration of authorisations, with port authorities demanding lengthier periods than those 
suggested by the Commission. This preference could be adequately explained taking 
into account that the ports have opted in several cases for authorisations that extend to 
75 or even 99 years of duration. Port operators and port authorities argued that shorter 
time authorisation could not allow for the full amortization of their investments in 
movable assets, and especially those investments immovable assets fully amortized. 
Evidently, these concerns triggered the reaction of port authorities on other issues as 
well.  
Compensations to existing service providers and the transitional regime were two 
further controversial issues. Details regarding compensation for past investments, 
especially in cases when a service provider would not yet be able to renew its 
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authorisation, were of great importance for port operators. Yet these details were not 
clarified in the context of the PSD II proposal. As regards the transitional period 
between the adoption of the PSD and its implementation, the industry (foremost port 
authorities) demanded sufficient time that would facilitate the amortization of past 
investments. 
There was also a dilemma regarding whether port authorities would continue to 
provide port services within the future regime, or if they should be neutral arbiters of 
port services provision by third parties. Whilst the Commission initially opted for the 
former option, port authorities opted for the latter. 
The various forms of state aid provided to ports by EU member states was an 
additional controversial issue. This public funding has the target to restructure the port 
facilities and allow for adjustment to contemporary challenges. However, it is also 
responsible for situations that cause distortions of port competition. Market opening 
within a port demands clarification of the condition for capital mobilisation in order to 
avoid situations where this mobilisation favours certain port enterprises. As explained in 
the forthcoming sections, certain stakeholders were particularly interested in such 
clarifications.  
The proposed permission of self-handling and the liberalisation of pilotage led to 
numerous reactions as well. On the issue of self-handling, under current national rules, 
port authorities in Europe are required to employ only local union labourers to load and 
unload cargo. However, exemptions are not rare and are (mostly) observed in dedicated 
terminals. Shipping companies and some ports would like casual labourers or ship 
crews to be allowed to perform these services. Trade unions, as well as port operators, 
were against the potential of self-handling services. Port authorities were divided, 
because in some ports self-handling is already applied. Shipowners and shippers had a 
united front in favour of allowing self-handling. As regards pilotage, many stakeholders 
advocated the degrading safety implications due to a potential liberalisation of this 
service. Maritime pilots felt strongly, stating that “pilotage isn’t a commercial service 
but a Maritime Public Safety Service with responsibility for protection of the 
environment” (EMPA, 2005). 
 
 
4. Policy makers’ reactions 
 
Despite the presence of all these controversies, a number of parameters contributed to 
the institutional ‘push’ toward the fast re-introduction of the PSD proposal in the 
European agenda. For the EU policy-making standards, the time span between the 
rejection of the controversial initial proposal and the re-opening of the process was 
extremely tight indeed.  
European integration is based on the liberalisation of the economy. Both PSD 
proposals were consistent with this spirit. Within the European integration experiment, 
the port sector has been among the few cases in which the liberalisation process has not 
progressed. Both the industrial complexity, produced by the heterogeneity of the 
industry, and the difficulties in identifying port policy either as an ‘industrial’ or as a 
‘transport’ policy, contributed to the observed difficulties to promote a supranational 
regime (Pallis, 1997).  
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On the other hand, in the 1990s, port market liberalisation progressed in the context of 
the national policies (i.e. Italy, Spain, etc). Notably, alongside PSD II, the Commission 
introduced a proposal for another directive (the ‘Bolkenstein’ Directive) aiming to 
eliminate any barriers that prevent businesses from offering services across the EU. This 
initiative re-emphasised the EU commitment to liberalise services in the Single 
European Market, and even though it was decided to exclude transport and thus port 
services from the scope of the directive (due to their peculiarity), the spirit is apparent. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice had started to examine concessions to port 
service providers or labour organisations on a case-by-case basis. 
Bureaucratic politics stand as another influential parameter. The urgent reintroduction 
of the PSD took place just two months before the Commission’s college stepped off 
power, with ‘self-motivation’ of the departing politicians being evident. To the 
Commissioner of the time responsible for Transport (Loyola de Palacio), the PSD 
proposal was a key theme of the transport strategy that she pursued during her stay in 
office. In an attempt to push it through, she had already advanced the application of the 
rule in her country of origin, Spain (Orru, 2005). Similarly to what it has done in other 
relevant policy areas, like maritime safety (Pallis, 2006) and shortsea shipping 
(Alexopoulos, 2000), the European Commission attempted to act as policy-innovator 
and act as the key actor for promoting port policy. The potential of progress was limited 
by that fact as the content of this second proposal was considerably different from the 
text that the conciliation between the Commission and the European Parliament had 
produced in 2003. The EP, which had voted against the first proposal, was not happy 
with this ‘premature’ Commission initiative. 
This institutional conflict advanced the existing participation of maritime interests in 
the EU port policy-making process. In general, both the EP and the Commission 
maintain a rather good relationship with interest groups (Mahoney, 2004), and in the 
case of the PSD, the EP invested further towards this direction. Consistent with the 
route of the enforcement of the relationship with the interest groups, the EP organised a 
public hearing with the participation of all interest groups (June 2005). The results of 
this meeting, along with a number of impact studies that were presented during the 
public hearing, or were publicly circulated (ESPO, 2004b; DfT, 2005; OSC, 2005), 
further enhanced the discontent vis-à-vis the Commission’s proposal. 
At the national level, governments were divided as well. Although they all agreed in 
principal, several tensions were apparent and portrayed as a conflict between the 
continental and the Anglo-Saxon approach to port organisation. In fact, some member-
states that had already opened access to the port services market worried that the PSD II 
would have negative effects, i.e. crowding-out of existing investors, and creating a mid-
term legal uncertainty. Others (i.e. the Mediterranean countries and the new members of 
the EU), however, were in favour of the PSD II proposal, seeking the introduction of 
intra-port competition in their national port systems. 
 
 
5. Interest groups reactions 
 
A number of interest groups attempted to promote a large number of amendments and 
lead the PSD proposal toward a more positive (in their terms) direction, or even to 
provoke the rejection of the proposal. They did so by following multi-level lobbying 
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practices (Pallis, 2007), which acknowledge the dynamic of both the Commission and 
the EP in the EU institutional setting. Impact studies, either commissioned by 
stakeholders (ESPO, 2004b), national governments (DfT, 2005; ECORYS and 
Trandemco, 2005) or third-parties (OSC, 2005), provided an input towards the 
formation of the critical stance advocated by these interest-groups. 
In practice, the strong stance of port stakeholders towards the PSD II led to the 
formation of an informal alliance and an ‘issue network’ (Greenwood, 2003). The joint 
position statement of ESPO and FEPORT (2002) provides an illustrative example. 
However, this network was formed incidentally, and corporation between the maritime 
interest groups remains occasional. 
 
 
Port Authorities 
 
For port authorities, reaching a common position vis-à-vis the PSD II was not an easy 
task, especially since the Euro-federation that represents them (ESPO - European Sea 
Ports Organisation) has a wider membership than the EU. Some ESPO members 
opposed the directive, with others being neutral. The existence of (quasi)open market 
access regimes in some North European ports added to the Anglo-Saxon thoughts that 
the directive might induce a number of disturbing structural changes. This was observed 
especially in those cases in which intra-port competition is already a fact. In the context 
of ESPO, port authorities reached a sceptical common position, and they actively 
promoted this stance in the EU policy-making process. 
During the consultation process regarding the initial PSD proposal, ESPO was in 
favour of the directive. The situation changed dramatically after the hasty reintroduction 
of the matter in the agenda. The core of the problem was that PSD II ignored the 
amendments of the conciliation procedure that had taken place in the context of the 
discussion of the first proposal (2003). For port authorities, the details of the agreement 
that had been reached within that process were very important: the agreement had 
incorporated most of their demands.  
The reaction to the PSD II proposal was mostly based on the adoption by the 
Commission of a ‘one size fits all’ policy approach and the consequent ‘absence of 
flexibility’. On these grounds, the main areas in which ESPO sought to alter the 
Directive proposal were: 
• The protection of the interests of existing providers of port services in European 
ports. 
• The mandatory authorisations for potential and existing providers. 
• The maximum durations for authorisations. 
• The provisions regarding self-handling of cargoes. 
• The simplification of the proposed regime. 
As regards authorisations, ESPO requested an increase in the number of criteria for 
the limitation of (existing or potential) service providers and demanded that the 
personnel should be a choice of the service provider itself. ESPO expected a 
clarification on the exact way that the new regime would limit the continuation of the 
existing providers’ operation, demanding a reconsideration of the rights of existing 
providers. Furthermore, it advocated that the port authority and the competent authority 
for granting and monitoring authorisations should be the same body. ESPO’s 
proposition about durations was: (a) in the case of no-investments by the providers, it 
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recommended a 10-year limit; (b) in the case of investments in movable assets, it 
recommended a 15-year limit; (c) in the case of investments in immovable assets, it 
recommended a 45-year limit. As expected, port authorities were strongly discontented 
with the prospect of allowing self-handling by shipping companies. 
ESPO (2005) demanded the withdrawal of the PSD II proposal (November 2005). To 
support this view and, not least, to enhance the quality of the internal consultation, 
ESPO initiated an economic impact study, which assessed the consequences that the 
implementation of the PSD II would have. This study produced two very interesting 
results. First, that 19 out of the 20 participating ports identified a negative impact by the 
implementation of the PSD II. Second, that the participating ports had once again 
demonstrated the vital heterogeneity of the port industry, either by expressing different 
opinions on the same issue, or by giving different answers to the same questions, 
(ESPO, 2004b). 
Precisely because of this heterogeneity, the various impact studies that took place 
during the same period reached different conclusions depending on the examined 
sample. Some concluded that there would be no substantial impact (OSC, 2005), whilst 
others predicted a positive impact (Pallis and Vagellas, 2005). These differentiated 
results came to emphasise the importance of the sector’s diversity. 
 
 
Private Port Operators 
 
Reaching a unanimous position was less complicated for private port operators. The 
Federation of Private Port Operators (FEPORT) opposed both Commission PSD 
proposals. PSD II was even more annoying than the first one; insofar as it differed in the 
agreement that had been reached during the conciliation procedure of the first proposal. 
On the practical front, FEPORT had major objections, in essence demanding a rewriting 
of the proposal. In addition to the self-handling provisions which were considered as the 
major problem, FEPORT requested changes in the provisions about mandatory 
authorisations, durations, compensation, and transition periods.  
FEPORT’s view was that the criteria for providing an authorisation should be further 
increased. Agreeing with ESPO, FEPORT argued that the port authority and the 
competent authority could be the same body, as far as an anti-trust organization would 
secure the fair and transparent functioning of the port. FEPORT also shared ESPO’s 
position on the issue of service providers’ limitation. As regards the “really important” 
duration of authorisations, FEPORT demanded an increase of the authorisations’ 
maximum length, the preservation of the right to extend an authorisation, and the 
examination of each case with an agreement between the two contracted parts. As far as 
self-handling was concerned, FEPORT advocated the need for the same criteria as in the 
case of other services to be applied, and the examination of each case separately. 
Finally, FEPORT (2005) demanded a framework that, in case of authorisation 
termination, would provide compensation which would be greater than the amount of 
amortized investments. 
The opposition of the port industry as a whole (i.e. including both port authorities and 
private operators) had been detailed earlier by a joint ESPO and FEPORT statement 
(March 2002) concerning the first PSD proposal. The core of the problem was that, 
according to these two interest groups representing the most significant parts of the port 
industry, the conciliation draft, which had not been taken into consideration by the 
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Commission, could be a starting point. The second proposal had the problems of the 
first one, while it introduced additional ones as well.  
Port authorities and private operators assessed that, at this point at least, the European 
Parliament provided a stand to advocate their cause. Hence, during the consultation 
process, ESPO and FEPORT decided to publicise their positions and lobby the 
European Parliament with a more intense and systematic way. Due to the indications of 
a shift of powers between the European institutions, the strategy of these two interest 
groups also changed: they decided to accompany the strategy of approaching the 
Commission’s and other institutions’ officials (access strategy), with the use of 
strategies which had a more public appeal (voice strategy). 
 
 
Shipowners 
 
The stance of shipowners and shippers vis-à-vis the liberalisation of port services and 
the PSD II proposal had constantly been positive. Shipowners in particular advocated 
the liberalization of the port services for more than a decade, whether or not this 
liberalisation has been discussed in the context of other maritime policy initiatives (i.e. 
the promotion of shortsea shipping in Europe) or the port policy per se. ECSA 
(European Community Shipowners Association) reassured this positive stance even 
after the rejection of the PSD II proposal by the European Parliament. In reaction to this 
rejection, French shipowners stated their will for a restart of the process of port services 
liberalization as soon as possible.1 
Shipowners expressed their own position in almost all the controversial fields of the 
proposal. According to them, authorisations should be of optional character and each 
service provider should be scrutinized for professional efficiency. On the issue of 
limitations to services’ provision, ECSA was not very positive. Shipowners argued for 
an exclusion of these provisions from the EU policy framework, as well as for the need 
to further clarify the proposed criteria and the ‘reasons of national security’ that could 
lead to such limitations. Finally, ECSA advocated that there should be at least two 
service providers for each port service. As far as authorisations were concerned, ECSA 
demanded the reduction of their duration and the extension of the authorisation only in 
the cases in which important investments occurred. On the issue of self-handling, ECSA 
endorsed a positive stance but wanted the implementation of self-handling to be limited 
to ocean shipping personnel, rather than expanded to land-based personnel. Within its 
statement during the PSD II related public hearing organised by the European 
Parliament, ECSA (2005) stated that: “Whilst insisting on a further liberalization, ECSA 
feels that the proposed Directive II, needs further study and analysis particularly on five 
critical points notably: authorisation, duration, compensation, transitional periods and 
self-handling”. 
Shipowners are among the most powerful stakeholders, and they demonstrated the 
ability to influence EU maritime transport policy developments and direct them towards 
their interests (Pallis, 2002). Their relative power is the outcome of their economic 
power and, foremost, of the advantage offered by capital mobility (Aspinwall, 1995), 
which allows them to pressure political institutions successfully at national and regional 
supranational levels. As a powerful maritime interest group, ECSA had used different 
                                                 
1
 See the reaction published only five days after the rejection of the Commission proposal: French 
owners: EU port talks must restart. Lloyd’s List, 23 January 2006. 
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strategies, taking advantage of its economical and political power. Like port industry 
representatives, in the case of the PSD II proposal, ECSA expressed its preferences 
publicly, via statements that aimed at influencing all the EU institutions, including the 
EP. Yet, the economic conditions and the consequential port industries’ stance prevailed 
over the shipowners’ capacity to determine policy outputs. 
 
 
Shippers 
 
Shippers, like other interest groups of the maritime sector, participated in the EP 
public hearing of June 2005, demonstrating a change in their interests’ representation 
strategy. They chose a ‘voice’ strategy with a more public appeal, instead of an ‘access 
strategy’ (Beyers, 2004). 
The European Shippers Council (ESC) expressed similar positions to the shipowners, 
while, in some respects (i.e. ports in which the directive would apply), it advocated a 
more liberalised regime. ESC welcomed the PSD II proposal and pushed for further 
services liberalisation. Their stance was in favour of the further extension of the scope 
of the PSD, in a way that it would cover all EU ports and all port services, rather than 
those defined in the proposal. Advocating that shippers are often victims of 
protectionism of the liner shipping industry, they lobbied for the ‘full liberalisation’ of 
port services. Among others, the latter was the opportunity to liberalise a part of the 
transport chain, with other parts expected to follow. As regards the PSD II proposal, the 
shippers’ major concerns related to two issues: the durations of authorisations and self-
handling, respectively. On the issue of self-handling, shippers were positive, whilst they 
demanded a specific period determination of concessions’ durations by the regulatory 
regime. As regards self-handling, they pursued a liberalised regime that would not 
create an exclusive right of services provision by the carriers of the cargoes 
(shipowners) but would create opportunities for them to handle these cargoes. 
 
 
Trade Unions 
 
Dockworkers were the most discontent stakeholders. Their stance had been expressed 
in the context of the discussions of the first PSD proposal, with their strong opposition 
contributing to the failure of the proposal. This happened despite the fact that in this 
process transport workers were not exactly united. Different organizations, including the 
European branch of ITF (International Transport Workers Federation), the ETF 
(European Transport Workers Federation) and the IDC (International Dockworkers 
Council), followed separate campaigns. There were sporadic national level campaigns 
(i.e. the Netherlands), as well. Progressively, trade unions realised that a united front 
would contribute to the accomplishment of their goals and provoke the greatest pressure 
possible. 
In order for this collective action to result in effective union articulation, new labour 
networks were established aiming at a trans-national corporation (Turnbull, 2005) that 
would take advantage of two industrial characteristics: firstly, the immobility of capital 
and secondly a strong workplace union organization. The trade unions had a ‘weak 
start’ during the first PSD proposal, but during the discussions of the PSD II proposal 
they were more organised and expressed their resistance dynamically. 
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Three were the topics that concerned port workers mostly: (a) the mandatory character 
of authorisations, (b) the prospect of self-handling, and (c) the definition of the 
competent authority. Port workers advocated that authorisations should be optional, 
rather than mandatory, and that further criteria for potential service providers should be 
introduced. They also argued that in all cases the port authority should differ from the 
competent authority. This should be ensured by the existence of an anti-trust 
organisation. As expected, trade unions were in principal against any form of self-
handling, arguing that self-handling was against Decision 137 of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), on safety and social grounds. 
Maintaining a dynamic momentum, dockworkers continued to declare their 
opposition to the liberalisation of port services. Unlike other maritime interest groups, 
trade unions like any social character interest groups followed a voice strategy 
throughout the policy-making process. With their statements and especially their 
dynamic demonstrations, they pressed to influence public opinion, as well as the vote of 
the members of the European Parliament. Their campaign was marked by the dynamic 
demonstrations of January 2006, when dockworkers marched (and had a violent 
confrontation with police forces) in Strasbourg. These events took place in proximity to 
the European Parliament’s buildings. As they were ‘heard and felt’ by the MEPs, it can 
be argued that these events contributed in favour of the dockworkers’ stance during the 
voting that took place some days later: the vote resulted in the rejection of the PSD II 
proposal by an overwhelming majority. 
 
 
Other Interest Groups 
 
The other interest groups that expressed their point of view during the policymaking 
process were the Euro-groups representing freight forwarders (CLECAT), the European 
Tug-Owners Association (ETA), the European Maritime Pilots Association (EMPA) 
and the European Boatmen Association (EBA). Each of these associations had different 
priorities and focused on different aspects of the proposed port policy. 
Overall, CLECAT identified a very positive development for the European port 
industry in the proposal. However, it put forward some amendments, in particular the 
provisions concerning granting of authorisations and self-handling. In the latter case 
CLECAT was in support of allowing self-handling in European ports. The EBA 
statement was also positive, as it stated that the main disagreement was not the principle 
but the details of the proposed PSD II: their demand was the exclusion of self-handling 
from the span of the directive. 
EMPA’s main concern was the potential inclusion of pilotage services within the span 
of the PSD. Strongly arguing that pilotage as a service has a lot to do with matters of 
safety and cannot be treated as a profitable occupation, EMPA made clear that pilots in 
the EU would not tolerate the pilotage inclusion in the PSD.  Finally, the ETA stated 
very clearly that it did not support the drafted directive. This stance was based on the 
fact that the revised proposal ignored the details of the agreement that had been reached 
in the conciliation committee. That said, ETA did not clarify if it condemned the whole 
effort in principle or because of some specific details. It might be assumed that for ETA 
the main problem was that it wanted different criteria for the service of towage. 
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Consumers 
 
As they are not organised in an interest-group, the ultimate consumers’ perspective 
was not expressed in a systematic way during the discussion of any of the two PSD 
policy proposals.  The debate was dominated by other interest groups and the outcome 
was determined by the power of interested parties on the supply side and their success 
in preserving their own powerful positions. 
Notably, these consumers would be among the beneficiaries of the proposed increased 
competition in the European port sector. The main effects of the endorsement of the 
proposed regime would be the lowering of entry barriers for entering the market and the 
enhancement of the intra-port competition. Today, regulatory (as well as economic, and 
geographical) entry barriers are substantial in most seaports and are getting more 
complex as modern ports are increasingly embedded in supply chains and parts of 
multilayered networks with multiple entry-levels. Lowering entry barriers is desirable 
from an economic point of view, since they enhance the contestability of markets and 
increase the level of intra-port competition (De Langen and Pallis, 2006b). The latter 
might result in substantial benefits, such as preventing abuse of market power and 
fostering specialisation. Users of services, especially the captive ones, are less exposed 
to monopolistic pricing conditions and excess rent seeking from service providers, a 
positive effect that results in lower final prices that the consumer ultimate pays. 
Furthermore, in conditions of intra-port competition, port service providers have 
incentives to specialise and differentiate their services from competitors in the same 
port. This results in faster implementation of new technologies and business models, in 
turn leading to more tailor-made services. The ultimate effects are the efficient and 
effective transportation of every type of cargo to be consumed (De Langen and Pallis, 
2006a). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A core element in the search of a long-term EU port policy has been the opening of 
access in the provision of port services in European ports. Free market operation is in 
line with the wider project of European political and economic integration, a fact that 
was recently highlighted by the Bolkenstein directive aiming at liberalising services in 
the EU. However, due to the peculiarities of the market, port services were excluded 
from this directive and have been the subject of a different Commission’s proposal on a 
port services directive (PSD). This measure would restructure the industry, thus the 
proposal became part of a lengthy debate. As the PSD has been rejected twice by the 
EP, the debate has (at least temporarily) closed with a policy output failure.   
The analysis demonstrated that interest groups formed an informal ‘issue network’, 
aiming at influencing the policy-making process. Although they do not share the same 
perspectives, vested interests lobbied for the same goal: to achieve the withdrawal of the 
PSD II proposal, due to the identification of structural deficiencies in the proposed 
regime (Table 2). 
In the aftermath of the introduction of the PSD II proposal, maritime interest groups 
identified institutional tensions. They realised the unease of the European Parliament 
and used voice strategies towards this institution in order to influence the final policy 
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outcome successfully. Assisted by the core characteristics of the economic environment 
(mostly by the heterogeneity of the European port sector and the difficulties that this 
heterogeneity causes any attempt to adopt any ‘one size fits all’ supranational port 
policy), the stance of organised maritime interests decisively contributed to the second 
rejection of this EU port policy initiative. 
By seeking a strict pan-European regime with minimum implementation flexibility, 
the Commission was unable to address the concerns of stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
Commission overlooked the draft of the Conciliation Committee that had been agreed in 
2003, even though this agreement was considered as a good starting point for further 
discussions by several interest groups. On the contrary, the Commission preferred to 
draw up a new proposal virtually from scratch. In certain aspects, this second proposal 
was stricter (i.e. durations of authorisations) and thus less attractive to maritime interests 
than the conciliation committee draft, or even the initial PSD proposal. Moreover, this 
Commission’s stance created certain institutional tensions. This situation gave the 
opportunity to several organised interests to advocate the maximum of their preferences, 
and seek the accommodation of all of their demands rather than search for a workable 
policy regime. 
Table 2: Maritime interest groups vs. the PSD II proposal 
 ESPO FEPOR
T 
ECSA ESC ETF EMPA CLECA
T 
ETA EBA 
Mandatory nature of 
authorizations for port 
services provision 
- - + + + + n.e - -- n.e 
Selection procedure - - + - n.a. n.e n.e n.e. n.e 
Limitation of service 
providers + - CC - n.a. n.e. n.e n.e. n.e 
Mandatory nature of 
authorizations for port 
services provision 
- - + + + + n.e - -- n.e 
Compensation of 
existing providers - - - CC - n.e n.e + - n.e 
Transitional periods - - - CC - - n.e - -- n.e 
 Liberalisation of Self-
handling - - - - + + - - - - + + n.e. - - 
Liberalisation of  
Pilotage services - - n.e. + + + + - - n.e. n.e. - - 
Competent Authority - - n.e. n.e. + n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. 
+ +: strongly positive.  
+: positive, but amendments.  
- : negative. 
- -: strongly negative. 
CC: support of the Conciliation Committee text.  
n.e.: No opinion Expressed.  
n.a.: non available. 
 
In terms of content, the Commission could have worked towards the creation of a 
more homogenised port operating framework, before proposing such a strict regime that 
the PSD II aimed to introduce. For instance, there is considerable scope for initiating a 
European policy proposal that would create the essential background conditions, like the 
clear and similar public funding regimes of port infrastructure projects, and legal 
certainty regarding the application of existing competition rules. Even then however, the 
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best policy option might remain to move away from a strict regulatory approach and 
look for alternative solutions such as a code of good practice or interpretative guidelines 
on the application of the rules of the Treaty. In any case, the ultimate goal needs to 
remain the same: to ensure a level playing field and lower entry barriers enhancing 
intra-port competition and benefiting consumers. 
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